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“KICKSHEWS OF SIMILITUDE"
Hobbes and the Subterfuge of Style
Roger D. Lund

While Hobbes’s critics and expositors have long debated the
meanings of Leviathan, they have exhibited surprising unanim
ity as to the significance of its style. Hobbes's apparent clarity
and absence of rhetorical artifice have often been contrasted
with the habits of other seventeenth-century prose writers
whose "tropes and cadences were yielding in popular favour to
the ‘plain' style so admirably exemplified in Hobbes."1 To
quote Victoria Silver, the distinction of Hobbes’s language
"resides in precisely that dearth of literary novelties and a
resolute, even perfected simplicity of statement, which has
inevitably earned Hobbes’s style the epithet ‘plain,’ and
persuaded both expen and lay reader alike that his positive
argument, if not his commentary, is science."2 Indeed for those
who argue the clear and immediate linkage between the new
science and the new plain style, Hobbes's writing is often cited

1 Samuel I. Mintz, Tht Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth Century Reactions to the
Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1962), 12.
2 Victoria Silver, "The Fiction of Self-Evidence in Hobbes's Leviathan," ELH 55
(1988): 351-79. Silver provides a persuasive account of Hobbes's efforts to
convince his readers that his arguments were self-evident. Silver argues, however,
that Hobbes's rhetoric actually functioned as he had hoped, while I suggest that
judging from contemporary responses, Hobbes's rhetoric was apparently far less
successful than Hobbes would lead us to believe.
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as a kind of a middle term between scientific reporting and
philosophical writing.3
This estimate of Hobbes’s plainness and simplicity has also
coincided with an emphasis on the "radical transparency” of
philosophical writing, a stylistic aspiration "to the condition
of neutral scientific notation."4 In opposition to more "liter
ary” or rhetorical forms of writing, philosophers have enter
tained what Berel Lang rather tartly describes as the "myth of
‘immaculate perception’ in philosophical writing—the tradition
al and still common ideal of the philosopher as disembodied
mind or reason in direct contact with the contents of the 'real’
world."5 As Lang argues, it has become our habit to read
philosophical texts “as addressing each other (and us) about a
common set of problems in a philosophically neutral medium
of discourse." Whether we are discussing Plato, Aquinas or
Hume, “it is only a matter of extracting from each of them the
common linguistic core that has been imbedded as a proto- or
meta language among the several historically distinct languages
in which those authors respectively wrote."6
If ever there was a philosopher who encouraged such a
belief, it was Thomas Hobbes, who seems to endorse some
thing like that "neutralist" view of philosophical language

3 Ian A. Gordon, The Movement of English Prose (Bloomington and London:
Indiana University Press, 1966), 121, in The Anatomy of Leviathan (London:
Macmillan; St. Manin's Press, 1968), F. S. Me Neilly remarks that “Leviathan, of
course, is to be regarded as a contribution to science...The two words 'science’ and
‘philosophy' are used interchangeably by Hobbes and cover a wide range of
enquiries which not only share the same methods and procedures but even, to a
large extent, form a single deductive system depending on the same fundamental
premises" (29-30). See also R. F. Jones, “Science and Language in England of the
Mid-Seventeenth Century." rpt. Seventeenth Century Prose, ed. Stanley Fish (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 325; George Williamson, The Senecan
Amble (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 214-16, 296-97
4 John J Richetti, Philosophical Writing Locke, Berkeley, Hume (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1983), 8 Victoria Kahn observes that “the majority of
Hobbes's critics, at least in the twentieth century, have persisted in reading the
Leviathan primarily as a logical argument Two points need to be made about
this approach The first is that this reading seems to correspond, at least in pan,
to Hobbes's stated intention in Leviathan, for as we have seen, while rhetoric and
logic were not as strictly separated in Hobbes's tune as in our own, it is also clear
that Hobbes wants to subordinate a rhetoric ol probability and passion to a logic
of certainty and reason." Rhetoric, Prudence and Skepticism tn the Renaissance
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1985), 157.
5 Berel Lang. The Anatomy of Philosophical Style (Oxlord: Basil Blackwell, 1990),
3
6 Lang. 13.
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adopted by modern expositors who regard his peculiar "care in
definition, distrust of metaphor, and demonstrations in both
logic and method" as somehow providing a stable form of
discourse, one less susceptible to the vagaries of “literary
style."7 Certainly Hobbes’s fulminations against the deceptions
of rhetorical figures, his determination to achieve “constant
significations" of words, and his insistence upon the analogy
between arguments in philosophy and demonstrations in
mathematics suggest Hobbes’s belief in the possibility of a
transparent and rhetorically unmediated style.8 Hobbes clearly
endorses the “radical distinction between philosophy and
rhetoric" which had marked philosophical writing from Plato
onward, a distinction which, Berel Lang observes, "entails that
philosophy's literary or aesthetic character is related only
accidentally, if at all, to its philosophical content." In this
view, “the commitment of philosophical discourse is to
truth—whether in description or conceptualization but in any
event as distinct from the manner of representation in either."9
Modern expositors of Leviathan have generally taken Hobbes
at his word, placing him squarely in the camp of those
philosophers who “opted for a prose considered to be more
compatible with philosophic sobriety than swelling periods.”'10
At first glance Hobbes seems to provide justification for
those who wish to rank him with the opponents of rhetoric,
as he briskly denounces “Metaphors, Tropes, and other
Rhetoricall figures, in stead of words proper" (I, 5, 114),11
arguing that "The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous
Words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from
ambiguity; Reason is the pace;, Encrease of Science, the way,
and the Benefit of man-kind, the end. And on the contrary,
Metaphors, and sensless and ambiguous words, are like ignes
fatus, and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst in-

7William Sacksteder, “Hobbes: Philosophical and Rhetorical Artifice,” Philosophy
and Rhetoric, 17 (1984): 30-46. See also Richetti, 12.
8 Charles Cantalupo, A Literary Leviathan (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press,
1991), 52, points out that 'signification* is one of the most important recurring
words in Leviathan.
9 Lang, 2.
10 Miriam Reik, The Golden Lands of Thomas Hobbes (Detroit: Wayne State
University Press, 1977), 157.
11 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. with an Introduction by C. B. Macpherson
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1951). All citations from Leviathan are taken from
this edition and are cited by Book, Chapter, and page number in the text.
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numerable absurdities" (I, 5, 116-17). A second look at this
brave denunciation of figurative language, however, reveals a
complex matrix of metaphorical comparisons even as it denies
the legitimacy of such metaphors and tropes. As Victoria
Kahn points out, such stylistic assertions force us to ask "to
what extent [Hobbes] is in control of the obvious contradic
tions between his thematic statements and the rhetorical
practice of his text." Or to appropriate de Man’s terminology,
Hobbes's text contains a deconstructive aporia or gap between
the “metalinguistic statements...about the rhetorical nature of
language, and...a rhetorical praxis that puts these statements
into question."12
As John Richetti has shown, such linguistic ambiguity is
surprisingly common in seventeenth and eighteenth-century
philosophical writing which “seeks simultaneously to repudiate
rhetoric and to retain authority of dialectic, even as it tends to
redefine dialectic as implicitly rhetorical or merely verbal.”
The philosophical writing of the period is “caught within this
paradox and struggles to purify itself of the rhetorical adjuncts
so strongly at work in it." Tne result, Richetti argues, is that
writers like Locke, Berkeley and Hume produce what in
literary terms we might call “active text[s])" which “busily
disavow normal rhetoric even while reintroducing modified and
understated rhetorical forms."13 Hobbes certainly shares in this
rhetorical ambiguity, and as Gary Shapiro observes, he “is a
paradigm case of a philosopher whose own style of writing
violates the norms he sets down for rational discourse,”
providing a significant example of “the interplay of philosoph
ical themes and literary modes."14
If we are to understand this interplay in Leviathan, however,
we need a model more flexible than that offered by the “plain

12 Kahn, 157; qtd in Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism
after Structuralism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 245. As Brian Vickers
points out, In Defense of Rhetoric (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), diatribes
against the inherent falseness of rhetoric are common in the early modern period,
and have been influential with modern historians ol philosophy. "The danger is
that historians take such calls for the banishment of rhetoric as proof that this
duly took place.' (201).
13 Richetti, 21, 16. Vickers argues: 'For Locke, just as lor Hobbes in Leviathan
(1651) and Sprat in The History of the Royal Society (1667), the general truth holds,
that those who attack rhetoric, or metaphor, invariably have to use rhetoric, and
metaphor,' 199.
14 Gary Shapiro, 'Reading and Writing in Hobbes's Leviathan,' Journal of the
History of Philosophy 18 (1980): 147-57.
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style,” or common assumptions regarding the rhetorical
“neutrality" of philosophical texts.
Reapplying de Man’s
remarks on Locke, one might argue that if we are to grasp the
complexity of Hobbes's rhetorical program in Leviathan we
must read him, “to some extent, not in terms of explicit
statements (especially explicit statements about statements) but
in terms of the rhetorical motions of his own text.” For de
Man this means that we must "pretend to read" philosophical
works "ahistorically, the first and necessary condition if there
is to be any expectation of ever arriving at a somewhat reliable
history."15
One might subject Leviathan to the kind of
"ahistorical" analysis which de Man reserves for other works of
enlightenment philosophy. But as I suggest in this essay,
another means of reading Hobbes against the interpretive grain
is first to pay closer attention to the initial reception of
Leviathan by its earliest readers who were acutely aware of
Hobbes's "rhetorical motions." As we shall see, Hobbes’s
contemporaries were adept at looking beyond his declarations
of rhetorical intent and sensitive to the interplay of philosoph
ical themes and literary modes in his work. Hans Robert Jauss
has argued that "the first reception of a work by the reader
includes a test of its aesthetic value."16 And closer attention to
the initial reception of Leviathan by contemporaries for whom
reading against the grain came naturally, provides one method
of weighing the “aesthetic value” of a major philosophic text
against its putative “neutrality."
To treat Hobbes in this fashion is admittedly to swim
against the interpretive tide, which as John Richettipoints out,
has generally regarded all philosophical writing as a consecu
tive conversation" among philosophers both living and dead to
establish "the transhistorical truth of things." This dialogue “is
a strange one, since the dead are in effect not allowed to speak
their own language."17 S. I. Mintz has been one of the few
historians of early-modern philosophy to take seriously the
rhetorical specificity of contemporary discussions of Leviathan,
to suggest that the argumentative responses of Hobbes’s earliest

15 Paul de Man, “The Epistemology of Metaphor," In On Metaphor, ed. Sheldon
Sacks (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 14.
16 Hans Robert Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory," in
New Direction! in Literary Hutary, ed. Ralph Cohen (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1974), 12.
17 Richetti, 9.
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readers have something significant to tell us about his “philos
ophy.” But it is an argument flatly rejected by partisans of the
neutralist view of philosophic discourse like F. S. McNeilly,
who insists that all Mintz demonstrates is "how completely
Hobbes was misunderstood” by a "very pedestrian collection”
of seventeenth-century readers.18 McNeilly is partially correct,
for with the exception of Lord Clarendon and Bishop Bram
hall, Hobbes’s early assailants are not a pre possessing lot.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of reassessing the "first recep
tion” of Hobbes’s style they are indispensable, for they provide
privileged access to the aesthetic and linguistic expectations of
those readers who inhabited not only the same interpretive
community as Thomas Hobbes, but who might be said to have
lived on the same block. In effect, paying closer attention to
the responses of their earliest readers, taking seriously what
they understood contemporary philosophers to be saying is one
way of allowing the philosophic dead to speak in their own
language. Paradoxically, such historical analysis also allows the
philosophic dead more easily to speak in our own. For the
reconstruction of the initial reception of Leviathan reveals
suriprising congruences between the responses of Hobbes’s
earliest readers and the kinds of insights offered by some
versions of poststructuralist analysis. So it is, that when we
consult Hobbes’s contemporaries, we discover no consensus
regarding the plainness, perspicuity or clarity of his style.
Instead we encounter complaints of Hobbes’s obscurity,
rhetorical trickery and ambiguity, all consciously directed
toward the insinuation of principles whose true tendencies
would have been revealed by a genuine philosophical transpar
ency. Indeed, where Hobbes’s contemporaries were concerned,
it was neither the plainness nor self-evidence of Hobbes’s style
which rendered it virtually “unanswerable,”19 but its qualities
of indirection, implication and subterfuge, indeterminacies born
not of the inherent instability of language but of Hobbes’s
rhetorical assault on the political and religious certainties of the
age.

o o o o o o o
18 Me Neilly, 259.
19 John Dowel, The Leviathan Heretical- Or the Charge Exhibited in Parliament
against M. Hobbs, justified by the Refutation of a Book of his, Entituled the Historical
Narration of Heresie and the Punishments thereof (London: 1683), Preface.
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While they were admittedly hostile to Hobbes’s political and
metaphysical speculations, early readers of Leviathan were also
exquisitely sensitive to the implications of its style. In The
Deist's Manual Charles Gildon describes Hobbes’s response to
charges from a bookseller who had complained that a certain
man of learning could not understand Leviathan. "What, says
Mr. Hobbs can I help that, can I encrease his understanding?”
But, argues one bystander, that is “but a poor Defense of what
Argues him guilty of so great a Fault in writing as Obscurity.
If he wrote not to be understood, why did he Write at all?
And since Men of Sence and Learning did not understand him,
it is very plain, that he did not write with that Perspicuity
which he ought.”
On second thought, argues Gildon,
Hobbes’s obscurity cannot be described merely as bad writing,
for “It must be confessed in his justification, that such Argu
ments, as destroy the Knowledge of God, of Religion, and
Nature are best couch’d in Obscurity.”20 It is impossible to
document the authenticity of this anecdote, appearing as it does
in Gildon’s recantation of his previous expressions of Hobbist
and deistical views. Yet it oners an instructive instance of a
contemporary response to Hobbes that cuts against the modern
interpretive grain. Gildon clearly shares the horizons of
expectation of those like Thomas Sprat and his imitators who
valued the clarity and perspicuity of the new plain style. And
he just as obviously shares the assumption that philosophy
ought not to be confused with rhetoric. Less predictably,
Gildon argues that Hobbes violates these critical horizons by
employing a purposely obscure rhetoric in the hope, perhaps,
of avoiding prosecution.
Miriam Reik has argued that "Hobbes’s prose style was one
area, at least, in which his contemporaries had little to criti
cize.”21
But as we shall see, the putative "plainness” of
Hobbes’s style inspired criticism aplenty.
William Lucy
remarks, “what strangely perplexed kind of writing this is,”22
while Lord Clarendon discovers in Hobbes “a master faculty in
making easie things hard to be understood...By a mist of
words, under the notion of explaining common terms (the
meaning whereof is understood by all Men, and which his
20 Charles Gildon, The Deist's Manual (London: 1704). 104.
21 Reik, 165.
22 William Lucy, An Answer to Mr. Hobbes His Leviathan (London:

1673), 107.
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explanation leaves less intelligible then they were before) he
dazles Mens eies from discerning those Fallacies upon which he
raises his Structure.”23 John Eachard scoffs at Hobbes’s
"excellent gift of making things plain,” and his self-generated
reputation for laying down "the plainest truths” and in "the
purest English " Eachard burlesques Hobbes’s definition of an
aire as “a pleasure of sounds, which consisteth in consequence of
one note after another, diversified both by accent and measure."
"Truly Sir,” says Eachard's satiric persona, "I know nothing
comparable to it...for absolute exactness,” except perhaps
Zacutus' commentary on sausages in his "sixth Chapter of
minc'd meats: A Teame of Linkes (says he) is a certain train of
oblong termes, where the consequent of the first is concatenated to
the antecedent of the third, &c. So that every terme, tn the whole
traine is both antecedent and consequent "’24 Clarendon shares
Eachard's skepticism regarding the clarity of Hobbes’s defini
tions. "Would any man imagine that a man of Mr. Hobbes's
sagacity and provoking humor, should in his fourth Page so
imperiously reproch the Scholes for absurdity, in saying, That
heavy Bodies fall downwards out of an appetite to rest, thereby
ascribing knowledg to things inanimate; and himself should in
his sixty second Page, describing the nature of foul weather,
say, That it lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an
inclination thereto of many dates together; as if foul weather
were not as inanimate a thing as heavy Bodies, and inclination
did not imply as much of knowledg as appetite doth” (27).
Often grudging admiration for the “handsomeness ” of
Hobbes’s “style” was undercut by an uncertainty as to its
ultimate effects. Indeed, argues Thomas Tenison, “for this very
handsomeness in dressing his Opinions...he is to be reproved:
because, by that means, the poyson which he hath intermixed
with them, is, with more readiness and danger swallowed.”25
Only three years after the publication of Leviathan, Alexander
Ross complains that “There are some of his positions which
may prove of dangerous consequence, to green heads, and

23 Edward, Earl of Clarendon, A Brief ^lew and Survey of the Dangerous and
Pernicious Errors to Church and Stale in Mr. Hobbes's Book Entitled Leviathan

(Oxford: 1676), 21, 26. Subsequent references to Clarendon will be riled by page
number in the text.
24 John Eachard, Mr. Hobbs's State of Nature Considered (London: 1672; rpt.
[Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1958), 14, 29), 14, 29.
25 Thomas Tenison, The Creed of Mr. Hobbes Examin'd: in a Feigned Conference
Between Him, and a Student in Divinity (London: 1670), Dedication.
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immature judgments, who look no farther than the superficies,
or outside of things, thinking all to be gold that glisters, and all
wholesome food that is pleasing to the tast; under green grass
lurch (sic) oftentimes snakes and serpents, such as Eundice
perceive not, till they be stung to death.”26 In this baroque
flurry of metaphor Ross condemns the poisonous conjunction
of style and substance in Leviathan, noting the danger which
lurks beneath the apparent safety of an appealing surface. Like
Ross, other readers note Hobbes’s penchant for what modern
critics might term reader entrapment, a deception aided in large
part by Hobbes’s apparent clarity and straightforwardness of
presentation. “I should not presume to except against so many
of Mr. Hobbes his definitions,” writes Lord Clarendon, “but
that pretending to so much plainness and perspicuity, and
having declared the necessary use of definition to be for the
setling the signification of words; without which he saies, a
man that seeks precise truth will find himself entangled in words
as a bird in lime twiggs." And Hobbes observed his own rule,
Clarendon concedes, "except where he found it necessary for
his own purpose sometimes to perplex and belime his Readers”
(289).
Victoria Silver points out Hobbes's “perspicuous and
graceful expression, which with surreptitious force impels the
reader from point to point with no vantage for reflection.”27
But it was precisely this “surreptitious force which so worried
contemporary readers like Clarendon. “Those books have in
all time done most mischief, and scatter’d abroad the most
pernicious errors,” he writes, “in which the Authors, by the
Ornament of their Style, and the pleasantness of their method,
and subtlety of their Wit, have from specious premises, drawn
their unskilful and unwary Readers into unwarrantable
opinions and conclusions, being intoxicated with terms and
Allegorical expressions, which puzzel their understandings, and
lead them into perplexities, from whence they cannot disen
tangle themselves” (2). In an elaborate comparison between
bees and men, Hobbes remarks that one reason for the success

26 Alexander Ross. Leviathan Drawn Out With a Hooh, or Animadversions Upon
Mr. Hobbs His Leviathan (London:
1653), Preface. It provides instructive
commentary on what was meant by plain style in the period that Alexander Ross
could say of his own style: “Expect not here from me Rhetorical flourishes: I
study matter, not words: Good wine needs no bush.’' Qtd. in Williamson, 176.
27 Silver, 354.
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of bees is “they want the art of words, by which some men
can represent to others, that which is Good, in the likeness of
Evill; and Evill, in the likeness of Good” (II, 17, 226). In a
word, bees lack precisely the kind of rhetorical sophistry which
Hobbes’s critics noted in his own writings. Eachard ironically
praises Hobbes’s "counterfit appearances of novelty and
singularity,” his "magisterial haughtiness, confidence and the
like” which have "cheated some people into a vast opinion of
himself, and into a beliefe of things very dangerous and false.”28
Hobbes had defined rhetoric as "that Faculty, by which we
understand what will serve our turn, concerning any Subject to
win belief in the hearer.” But to William Lucy, Hobbes
seemed to have violated his own principles, putting down his
arguments "in a language, and manner fit enough to steale a
beieefe of what he speaks into an inconsiderate Reader, although
he gives no proof of what he writes to a judicious Reader.”29
Such contemporary complaints of perplexity and reader
entrapment, of his "stealing,” not winning belief, seem strange
ly at odds with Hobbes’s modern reputation for perspicuity.
Indeed the Hobbes who emerges from the portraits of his
contemporaries seems less the pure philosopher than a rhetor
of the kind described by Pico de Mirandola: “For what else is
the task of the rhetor than to lie, to entrap, to circumvent, to
practise sleight-of-hand...to be able at will to turn black into
white, white into black; to be able to elevate, degrade, enlarge,
and reduce, by speaking, whatsoever you will...by magical arts,
as it were...by the powers of eloquence.”30 It is one paradox of
Hobbes’s early reception that his readers frequently saw in
Leviathan precisely that capacity to entrap the reader which
was the patented art of the rhetor, and which Hobbes himself
so passionately disavowed.
As if to preempt such criticism Hobbes argued that his own
mathematical method guaranteed escape from rhetorical
entanglement. “Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right
ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh
precise truth had need to remember what every name he uses
stands for; and to place it accordingly; or else he will find

28 Eachard, Epistle Dedicatory.
Qtd. in Kann, 155. William Lucy, Observations, Censures and Confutations of
29
Notorious Errours in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan and Other his Bookes (London:
1663), 137.
30 Qtd. in Vickers, 186.
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himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs... And
therefore in Geometry...men begin at settling the significations
of their words; which settling of significations, they call
Definitions; and place them in the beginning of their reckon
ing" (I, 4, 105). Certainly Hobbes speaks of the "settled
significations of words" with the implication that they may
have values as immutable as mathematical symbols (1, 5, 114).
And he strongly suggests, much in the manner of Descartes,
that his own philosophical argument develops as a form of
mathematical computation or "reckoning” immune to the
implicit ambiguities of literary mediation. Suspicious of ancient
autnority, Hobbes argues that we must "examine Definitions of
former Authors" since the errors of their original definitions
multiply as ‘“the reckoning proceeds.” So it is "that they which
trust to books, do as they that cast up many little summs into
a greater, without considering whether those little summs were
rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the errour visible,
and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way
to cleere themselves; but spend time in fluttering over their
bookes; as birds that entring by the chimney, and finding
themselves inclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false light of a
glasse window, for want of wit to consider which way they
came in" (I, 4, 105-06).
Hobbes would certainly have us believe that a neutral,
mathematical model can prevent such confusion, and his
suggestion that we can actually achieve the “constant sig
nification of words” or use them successfully as "counters” has
apparently convinced modern observers like S. I. Mintz that
“the language of geometry...lucid, free of verbal confusions, [is]
a perfect analogue of the kind of style which Hobbes hoped to
achieve in his nonmathematical writings."31 But, like his
denunciations of deceptive rhetoric, Hobbes's description of
how geometry frees us from rhetorical ambiguity is anything
but unambiguous. And it is ironic that a passage equating
reasoning with computation should depend not on logical
demonstration but on a shifting repertoire of figurative
comparisons. Here reading is like computing, and reasoning
from the conclusions of ancient authority is like the compound
ing of many smaller errors into a much larger miscalculation.
Those misled by such false computations are like birds (Hobbes

31

Mintz, 7.
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does seem afflicted with an avian fixation) entrapped in a closed
room, misled by false lights from deceptive windows. For all
Hobbes's assertions to the contrary, this is not mathematics,
but metaphor. And in a way, this passage adumbrates a
consistent procedure throughout Leviathan, playing off the
fictions of mathematical self-evidence against a far more
ambiguous metaphorical agenda. Hobbes's contemporaries
were certainly not taken in. For many of them his method
seemed anything but Euclidian, his own definitions of words
something less than constant. John Eachard sneers at Hobbes’s
“affected garbs of speech," his “starch'd Mathematical meth
od."32 And Clarendon complains of the manner in which
Hobbes wields the “Soveraign power over all definitions:
which he uses not (as is don in Geometry, which he sales, is
the only science it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow upon man
kind] as preliminaries or postulata, by which men may know
the setled signification of words, but reserves the prerogative to
himself to give new Definitions as often as he hath occasion to
use the same terms, then when it conduces to his purpose, he
may inform his Reader, or else perplex him'' (186).
Even Hobbes's acknowledgement of the inescapabihty of
rhetorical figurations is not entirely unambiguous. While he
is predictably hostile to metaphors, which "openly profess
deceipt," Hobbes is surprisingly receptive to the well-placed
simile: “In Demonstration, in Councell, and all rigorous search
of Truth, Judgement does all,” Hobbes argues, “except some
times the understanding have need to be opened by some apt
similitude; and then there is so much use of Fancy” 0, 8,
136-7). Having expelled figuration by the front door, Hobbes
readmits it through the kitchen entrance. Having allowed for
figurative language, however, Hobbes is quick to limit its uses
to “similitudes, that will please, not onely by illustration of his
discourse, and adorning it with new and apt metaphors; but
also, by the rarity of their invention" (1, 8, 135). One recent
critic has suggested that Hobbes attempts to draw nice distinc
tions between similitude and metaphor, the one a useful form
of figuration, the other the agent oi deceit.33 But in the passage
just cited, Hobbes seems to conflate the two, insisting only that
simile and metaphor be reserved for a subsidiary and essentially

32 Eachard, Epink Dedicatory.
33 Reik, 160.
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illustrative role in philosophic discourse. This uncertainty may
perhaps be traced to Hobbes's own translation of Aristotle’s
Art of Rhetorique that “A Similitude...is a Metaphor dilated-, and
a Metaphor, is a Similitude contracted into one Word,”34 a
definition which seems to muddle the distinctions between
forms of figuration appropriate for serious discourse and those
absolutely interdicted by virtue of their indeterminacy.
Although he rather coyly allows for the occasional “apt
similitude” (Aristotle warns against too frequent use of
similitudes since they are "Poeticall"), close reading of Leviathan
reveals the degree to which Hobbes relies on a variety of
comparative tropes including similes, analogies and metaphors,
what Robert Vilvain dyspeptically describes as “thes Kickshews
of arguing from similitude (which he derides in others).”35
Indeed, like many of his contemporaries, Vilvain recognizes
what has been obscured by time and interpretive consensus:
that it is not mathematical equation but more uncertain forms
of likeness which most often characterize the rhetoric of
Leviathan.
0 O 0 0 0 0 O
Hobbes’s description of the commonwealth as an “artificial
man” is, of course, the most obvious and most frequently cited
instance of his exploitation of rhetorical comparison. But it is
worth noting just how elaborate this similitude becomes: the
sovereign is like the soul of the commonwealth (II, 21, 272);
systems equal muscles (II, 19, 242); public ministers are like
nerves (II, 23, 290); the circulation of money is analogous to
the circulation of blood (II, 24, 300-301); and even procreation
finds its analogue in the spawning of plantations and colonies
(II, 24, 301). Some comparisons, like Hobbes’s description of
the nimble spaniel working the field (I, 3, 97), would become
commonplaces of Augustan literary theory, while others, like
his elaborate comparison of Jupiter ana the Pope (III, 42,
541-42) approximate epic simile.
Some similitudes, like
Hobbes’s comparison of monarchy to a family (II, 20, 257; II,
22, 285), seem so proverbial that we tend to overlook both
their figurative and their ideological significance. And often, as

The Rhetoric of Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Lamy, ed. John T. Harwood
(Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 110.
35 Robert Vilvain, Theoremata Theologia (London: 1654), 2J9.
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when he argues that those who trust only to the authority of
books and "follow the blind blindly, are like him that trusting
to the false rules of the master of Fence, ventures praesumptously upon an adversary, that either kills, or disgraces him” (I,
5, 117), Hobbes’s similitudes sharpen the argument so incon
spicuously that we forget he is exploiting figuration of all.
While Thomas Sprat may have felt that Hobbes’s style was
“sparing of similitudes,” a careful inventory of Leviathan reveals
the extent to which similitude provides a kind of syntax for
Hobbes’s rhetorical argument. Montaigne’s rejoinder to Locke
in one of Prior’s Dialogues of the Dead might just as easily
have been addressed to Thomas Hobbes: “You make Similes
while you blame them. But be that as it will...arguing by
Simile is not so absurd as some of You dry Reasoners would
make People believe. If your Simile be proper and good it is
at once a full proof, and a lively Illustration of Your matter,
and where it does not hold the very disproportion gives You
Occasion to reconsider it, and You set it in all it’s Lights, if it
be only to find how unlike it is. Egad, Simile is the very
Algebra of Discourse.”36 So for example, similitude provides
the framework upon which Hobbes’s mounts his explanation
of what happens when the unguided “Trayne of Thoughts”
becomes the confusion of those who dream of rebellion.
“Though even then their Thoughts are as busie as at other
times, but without harmony; as the sound which a Lute out
of tune would yeeld to any man; or in tune, to one that could
not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man
may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependence of
one thought upon another” (I, 2, 95). Thoughts without
harmony are like the pricksongs of an untrained hand, whereas
well-tempered thoughts are like that harmony which the lute
yields when played by a trained musician. Here rhetorical
figures do the work of argument as Hobbes emphasizes the
relative values of harmony, training and control when com
pared with the cacophony produced by the untrained and

36 Thomas Sprat, A Voyage to England, with Obiervationt (1709), 163-64. See also
“A Dialogue between Mr. John Lock and Seigneur de Montaigne,” tn Literary
Worki of Matthew Prior, ed. H. Bunker Wright and Monroe K. Spears (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1959), I: 625. The sheer quantity of Hobbes’s exploitation of
simile in Book I is worth noting: Reason is like trumps tn a card game (I, 5,
111-12); thoughts are like scouts and spies (I, 8, 137); madness in a multitude is
like the sea (I, 8, 141); our knowledge of god is like a blind man's knowledge of
fire (I. 11, 167); right is like a prize in a race (I. 14. 194).
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licentious hand. Hobbes also offers a political fable in mini
ature even as he presumes to describe the motions of the mind.
Such reliance on figurative and essentially “literary” devices
seemingly provides support for the argument that all language,
philosophical demonstration notwithstanding, “is ineradicably
metaphorical, ” that it "tends to betray its own fictive and
arbitrary nature at just those points where it is offering to be
most intensively persuasive.”37
Here Hobbes’s dependence on figuration is implicit and
unacknowledged, but elsewhere the propriety or "dispro
portion” of similitude, become the visible focus of his argu
ment. So, for example, he attacks Bellarmine’s assertion that
like the parts of a natural body, the members of every com
monwealth depend upon one another. While it is true,
Hobbes argues, that they "cohaere together,” they depend
"onely on the Soveraign, which is the Soul of the Common
wealth; which failing, the Common-wealth is dissolved into a
Civill war, no one man so much as cohaenng to another, for
want of a common Dependance on a known Soveraign; Just
as the Members of the natural! Body dissolve into Earth, for
want of a Soul to hold them together” (HI, 42, 602). Given the
prominence in Leviathan of the analogy between the body
politic and the body natural, Hobbes may be forgiven a
proprietary annoyance at Bellarmine’s apparent abuse of
Hobbes’s own pet similitude. It is important to note, however,
that in this instance Hobbes’s objection to Bellarmine’s misuse
of simile is quite unlike his usual complaints regarding the
hazards of figurative language. He makes no argument here, as
he does elsewhere, that figurative comparisons are unsuitable
for serious discourse, only that Bellarmine has misunderstood
the implications of his own choice of figures. “Therefore there
is nothing in this similitude, from whence to inferre a depend
ance of the Laity on the Clergy, or of the Temporall Officers
on the Spiritual!; but of both on the Civill Soveraign; which
ought indeed to direct his Civill commands to the Salvation of
Souls; but is not therefore subject to any but God himselfe”
(III, 42, 602-3).
Victoria Silver argues that Hobbes’s “similitudes invariably
seem flat and lacking in semantic dimensions,” that he is a

37 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1983), 145. As Victoria Silver points out, “Hobbes’s figures invariably occur in
polemical as against expository passages,” 352.
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"skillful rhetorician who achieves the greatest desideratum of
the art—persuasive artifice masked from the reader."'38 But, in
fact, Hobbes’s contemporaries penetrated the mask with some
ease, complaining frequently of his exploitation of similitude.
To Hobbes’s assertion that “The skill of making, and maintain
ing Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth
Arithmatique and Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on Practise
onely" (II, 2D, 261), Bishop Bramhall replies: “his argument is
most improper, and most untrue. State-policy, which is wholly
involved in matter, and circumstances of time, and place, and
persons, is not at all like Arithmetick. and Geometry, which are
altogether abstracted from matter, but much more like Tennis-play.
39
.
.
Like Bramhall, Ralph Cudworth notes the impropriety of
similitude as one of Hobbes’s significant failings, quoting at
length from Hobbes’s description of those who reason concern
ing the nature of God based on his attributes. Such persons,
Hobbes argues, that "losing their understanding in the very
first attempt, fall from one Inconvenience into another,
without end, and without number; in the same manner, as
when a man ignorant of the Ceremonies of Court, comming
into the presence of a greater Person than he is used to speak
to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himselfe from falling,
lets slip his Cloake; to recover his Cloake, lets fall his Hat;
and with one disorder after another, discovers his astonishment
and rusticity" (IV, 46, 694). Cudworth, a philosopher not
noted for his sensitivity to style, nevertheless makes it an issue
here, remarking that “thougn there be something of Wit and
Phancy in this, yet as it is applied to Theology and the
Genuine Attributes of the Deity, there is not the least of
Philosophic Truth.40 is important to note that as with
many of Hobbes’s first readers it is not the plainness of his
style that strikes Cudworth’s ear, but its rhetorical complexity.
Like Hobbes, Cudworth shares the fundamental presupposition
that truth is inconsistent with rhetorical trope, but like Gildon,
he condemns Hobbes for having abandoned philosophic truth
for the seductions of figuration.

38 Silver, p. 355.
39 John Bramhall, The Catching of Leviathan (Landon: 1658), 507.
40 Ralph Cudwonh, The True Intellectual System of the Universe (London: 1678),
Book 1, Chap. IV, 653.

"Kickshews of Similitude"

213

Cudworth’s complaint about Hobbes’s exploitation of "wit
and Phancy’’ deserves closer attention. For we discover that
the force of Hobbes’s argument often derives not from its
logical consistency or self-evidence, but from the suggestive
coloration of its figures of speech.
One might cite, for
example, Hobbes’s implicit comparison of the operations of
faculty psychology with the motions of a bucket brigade:
“Some say the Senses receive the Species of things and deliver
them to the Common-sense; and the Common Sense delivers
them over to the Fancy, and the Fancy to the Memory, and
the Memory to the Judgement, like handling of things from
one to another, with many words making nothing understood’’
(I, 2, 93). This assault on faculty psychology depends largely
on a pictorial vividness which makes the whole notion seem
not only illogical but foolish as well. In the Elements of Law
Hobbes observes that "not truth, but image, maketh passion,’”4
1
and we frequently discover that the efficiency of Hobbes’s
argument resides in his ability to find the right image to inspire
either the suspicion or the ridicule of those positions he most
distrusts. Thus when Hobbes remarks that “It is with the
mysteries of our Religion, as with wholesome pills for the sick,
which swallowed whole, have the virtue to cure; but chewed,
are for the most pan cast up again without effect" fill, 32,
410), it was to be expected that his readers would complain.
Despite the assertion of one recent critic that “Hobbes’s image
of mysteries chewed, swallowed, and cast up would have
carried little emotive impact in his own day,'”42 the rather glum
comment of Thomas Jenison—’’The danger, in my opinion
ariseth not from the mastication of the Physic, but from the
indisposed Stomach and Palate of the Patient"—suggest other
wise.43 Indeed as Clarendon remarks, swallowing things whole
provides a convenient analogue to the effects of Hobbes’s own
argument which is "very wittily and cunningly disgested, in a
very commendable method, and in a vigorous and pleasant
Style: which hath prevailed over too many, to swallow many
new tenets as maximes without chewing; which manner of

41 Elements of Law, qrd. in David Johnston, The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas
Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation (Princeton:
Princeton
University Press, 1986), 60.
42 Paul J. Johnson, “Hobbes's Anglican Doctrine al Salvation,' in Thomas Hobbes
in His Time, ed. Ralph Ross, Herbert W. Schneider, and Theodore Waldman
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974], 105.
43 Tenison, 43.
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diet for the indisgestion Mr. Hobbet himself doth much dislike”
(2).
In his discussion of historical narrative as extended meta
phor, Hayden White remarks on the ways in which the
historian “tells us in what direction to think...and charges our
thought about the events with different emotional valences.”44
Hobbes proceeds in an analogous fashion. Leviathan comes
laden with metaphors which threaten to "outrun and escape the
sense which tries to contain” them, displaying an almost
Derridean “surplus over exact meaning.”45 Such aggressively
unstable metaphors seem contrived to subvert the expectations
of his readers and thus short-circuit logical refutation. When,
for example, Hobbes argues that the reason ought “not to be
folded up in the Napkin of an Implicate Faith" fill, 32, 409),
we smile at first, but then our recollection of the uses to which
napkins are often consigned exposes a malicious ambiguity at
the heart of the comparison. It also reveals the cleverness of
Hobbes's rhetoric of persuasion. For he makes no attempt
openly to deny the validity of implicit faith as a religious
practice. Rather he undermines its credibility by insinuation
and invidious suggestion. While he may insist that metaphors
are to be excluded “in all rigourous search of truth...seeing
they openly professe deceipt" (1, 8, 137), Hobbes himself often
proceeds in a fashion which his readers found implicitly
deceitful. To quite a frustrated Bishop Bramhall, Hobbes
“setteth down his opinion just as Gipsies tell fortunes, both
waies, that if the one misse the other may be sure to hit, that
when they are accused of falsehood by one, they may appeale
to another."44
While Hobbes complains, in effect, of the disruptive power
of figurative language, it has seldom been remarked just how
often Hobbes's own argument, particularly in Book III of
Leviathan, depends upon such disruptions. His discussion of
the geographical location of heaven, for example, exploits the
implicit ambiguity of similitude and the slippage between the
metaphorical and the literal. “Concerning the place wherein
men shall enjoy that Eternal Life, which Christ hath obtained
for them," Hoobes writes, the Scriptures seem to locate it "on

44 Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins
University Press, 1978, 91.
45 Eagleton, 134
46 The Catching of Leviathan, 565.
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Earth. For if as in Adam all die, that is, have forfeited
Paradise and Eternal Life on Earth, even so in Christ all shall
bee made alive; then all men shall be made to live on Earth;
for else the comparison were not proper" (HI, 38, 480).
Contemporary readers, like Alexander Ross, were quick to
charge that it was Hobbes whose similes were improper, noting
his exploitation of the ambiguities separating literal and
figurative readings of scriptural metaphor. “The comparison is
not between the two places of heaven and earth,” writes Ross,
“but between the two persons of Adam and Christ.”’47 Claren
don notes that “How positive soever he is against the literal
understanding such places in Scripture, which seem to imply an
ascending into Heaven, and condemns them all to be Meta
phorical Expressions; now, that he may humble our salvation
down to earth, he will have all those places of the Prophets
which he chuses, to be understood literally" (228).
As Clarendon points out, Hobbes's complex and doubtful
exegesis turns on “proper” similitude whose propriety depends
upon a disruptive redefinition of a widely accepted signification.
Hobbes frequently dislocates common interpretations of
Scripture by making the familiar strange, that is, by convening
it into a parable, or making the strange familiar, a technique
which in a different context Maurice J. Quinlan has termed the
“literalization of metaphor,” a type of “purposeful ambivalence
achieved by contrasting the metaphorical and the literal
significance of a term, in order to reveal an ironic disparity
between the two meanings.”48 Recognizing the disruptive
ambivalence that lay behind Hobbes’s assertion that “Daemoniacks" were nothing but “Mad-men” (I, 9, 46), Vilvain asks, “was
that legion of devils, who besought Christ to enter into the
Gergesens Swine, and caried a whol Herd headlong into the
Sea, only a Diseas? Can Metaphors discurs or doo such
mischeef?"49
If Hobbes is to be credited metaphors do nothing but
mischief, and yet it would be hard to find a more mischievous
use of metaphor than Hobbes offers in Leviathan. In perhaps
his most famous denunciation of figurative language, Hobbes
had argued that “the foundation of all true Ratiocination, is the

47 Ross, 42.
48 Maurice J Quinlan, “Swift’s Use of Literalization as a Rhetorical Device,’
PMLA. 82 (1967), 516-21
49 Vilvain, 254
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constant signification of words; which...dependeth not (as in
naturall science) on the Will of the Writer, nor (as in common
conversation) on vulgar use, but on the sense they carry in
Scripture; It is necessary to determine out of the Bible, the
meaning of such words, as by their ambiguity, may render
what I am to inferre upon them, obscure, or disputable’* (III,
34, 428). Hobbes's dubious claim that one could actually
determine the meaning of ambiguous metaphors "out of the
Bible" (a practice which had provided no small encouragement
to the English Revolution and the Thirty Years’ War) ought to
awaken our suspicions that he is about to offer stipulative (and
thoroughly mischievous) definitions, born not of any familiar
tradition of interpretation, but of his own corporealist system.
Indeed if one were to isolate a definitive rhetorical feature of
Hobbes's analysis “Of a Christian Commonwealth" in Part III
of Leviathan, it might be his systematic redefinition of meta
phors by displacing one form of ambiguity, engendered by
traditional usage and scholastic obfuscation, with a new form
of ambiguity born of the Iiteralization of the operative
metaphors—spirit, baptism, consecration, church, priest
hood—of Christian theology.
As Hobbes makes clear in chapter 35, a right understanding
of God's intentions first requires a correct interpretation of the
figurative language of those biblical authors who had presumed
to speak on his behalf. Thus, for Hobbes, the soul equals life
(III, 38, 484) while Satan is defined as "any Earthly enemy of
the Church" (III, 38, 489). Hobbes redefines the Kingdom of
God as “a reall, not a metaphorical Kingdome" (III, 35, 447),
and “Out of this literalI interpretation of the Kingdome of God
ariseth also the true interpretation of the word HOLY. For it
is a word, which in Gods Kingdome answereth to that, which
men in their Kingdomes use to call Publique, or the Kings." (Ill,
35, 449). Hobbes's assurances notwithstanding, his literalization of the term “kingdom'' here [the commonwealth under
God bears no small resemblance to the Commonwealth under
Cromwell] serves not to provide “constant” signification but
rather to offer ancillary support to his political agenda. At
times Hobbes can be breathtakingly literal; he interprets II
Peter 2:4, which describes incineration of the rebellious angels
in hell, as proof of their corporeality, since by definition only
material beings could be expected to catch fire (III, 34, 439).
And based upon the literal interpretation of metaphor Hobbes
also denies the ascension of the saints into heaven. Because,
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the Scriptures say, the earth is God’s “footstool" (III, 38, 482),
it would be unsuitable to the dignity of a king if "the Subjects
of God should have any place as high as his Throne, or higher
than his footstoole" (III, 38, 494).
While Hobbes loudly declaims against the introduction of
metaphor and trope into serious discourse, when it suits his
purposes he seems quite willing to render metaphorical passages
which had long been interpreted literally. Thus his reinterpretation of God's interview with the seventy elders of Israel,
"God laid not his hand upon them, they saw God, and did eat
and drink (that is, did live)" (III, 40, 503). While Hobbes's
God (so often described as material) may give his elders life, he
is not so corporeal as to offer them lunch.50 So too, Hobbes
disposes of belief in the direct transcription of Scripture by
inspired writers: “where it is said (2 Tim. 3:16) all Scripture is
given by Inspiration from God, speaking there of the Scripture
of the Old Testament, it is an easie metaphor, to signifie that
God enclined the spirit or mind of those Writers to write that
which should be useful in teaching, reproving, correcting, and
instructing men in the way of righteous living" (III, 34, 440).
In similar fashion, Hell, which in Revelation 21:8 seems to be
taken literally, is reinterpreted metaphorically: “So that it is
manifest, that Hell Fire, which is here expressed by Metaphor,
from the reall Fire of Sodome, signifieth not any certain kind,
or place of Torment; but is to be taken indefinitely, for
Destruction" (III, 38, 486). Robert Vilvain laughs at such
literalization of metaphor, suggesting that for Hobbes, “the
Damnd go t' Hel Tropicaly."51 Calling attention to the
implications of Hobbes's relentless reinterpretation of figurative
language, Alexander Ross remarks that “Because the Prophets
in the Old Testament by allegorical terms describe the hap
piness of Christs Church under the Gospel; therefore Mr.
Hobbs will needs (cap 38) have these phrases to be understood
of an earthly kingdom after the resurrection; but the Prophets
speak of pleasant rivers and fields, of woods and groves, of
horses, and charriots, of eating and drinking, and all kinds of

50 Harald Bloom points out the peculiarly literal quality of this “picnic scene,
Moses and seventy elders of Israel sitting and eating a Covenant meal while staring
directly at Yahweh." In Ruin the Sacred Truths (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1989). 7.
51 Vilvain, 254.

218

1650-1850

earthly delights; which if Mr. Hobbs understood literally, I
shall think his opinion relisheth too much of the Alcoran."''52
In the Epistle Dedicatory, Hobbes conceded "That which
perhaps may most offend, are certain Texts of Holy Scripture
alledged by me to other purposes than ordinarily they use to
be by others" (76). And ne was not mistaken, for in the third
book of Leviathan the pursuit of constant signification invariab
ly devolves into a complex and often invidious deflation of
scriptural metaphor.53 Hobbes deliberately introduces elements
of indeterminacy tailor-made to unsettle common associations
of words and things, and he seems amenable to a mode of
exegesis—either literal or figurative—which suits his larger
rhetorical purposes.
Hobbes engages, for example, in a
systematic demolition of New Testament logocentrism (III, 36,
455), drawing distinctions between the “proper" understanding
of figurative language and the “metaphorical" uses to which it
is commonly misapplied. He mordantly observes that in Latin
Christ is called verbe, in French parole. Those that “doe
commonly call him the Verbe of God, do but render the text
more obscure," Hobbes argues. They might as well term him
the Nown of God" (III, 36, 454-55). It is hard to know just
how to describe this transformation of one person of the
Trinity into a part of speech. One might argue that such
impish wordplay exploits the tendency of metaphors to jump
“the boundaries that separate the name of one entity from the
name of another." Indeed de Man argues, “tropes are not just
travellers, they tend to be smugglers and probably smugglers of
stolen goods at that. What makes matters even worse is that
there is no way of finding out whether they do so with
criminal intent or not."54 Where Hobbes’s metaphors were
concerned, his contemporaries had no doubt as to his mis
chievous intentions. With regard to Hobbes’s version of Christ
as Word, William Lucy grumbles that Hobbes has “taken a
greate deale of paines to raise mud in, and darken this cleare
stream.”55
Richard Rorty points out that although Hobbes and
Descartes are often cited as the founders of "modern philoso-

52 Roll. 50.
53 Clarendon complain! of (he ambiguity ol Hobbes's definitions “miracles." “hell
fire," “satan," “devils," etc., 215-25.
54 de Man, 17.
55 Obiervationi, Cemurei, Con/ulalioni, >25.
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phy," they did not think of themselves as offering “philosoph
ical systems," but as contributing to the efflorescence of
research in mathematics and mechanics, as well as liberating
intellectual life from ecclesiastical institutions.”56 As Hobbes’s
contemporaries recognized, bis clever manipulation of the
ambiguities of figuration formed pan of a rhetorical assault on
the very fundamentals of the Christian faith. Indeed, as
Clarendon argues, “Under the notion of translating proper and
significant words and terms, in the understanding whereof all
Learned men have agreed, into vulgar and common Language,
which no terms of any Art ever admitted, [he] hath in truth
traduced the whole Scheme of Christianity into Burlesque”
(200).
Seekers of burlesque need search no farther than
Hobbes's sly ridicule of transubstantiation. “The words, This
is my body, are aequivalent to these, This signifies, or represents
my Body-, and it is an ordinary figure of Speech: but to take
it literally, is an abuse" (IV, 44, 635). One might wonder
exactly what Hobbes means by an “ordinary figure of speech”
here, since for him figuration is never “ordinary,” or how one
is to decide just when a trope is to be literalized and when an
apparently literal statement is to be taken as a figure of speech.
As he does so often, Hobbes proceeds as if the answers to such
questions are self evident, moving briskly to the real business
at hand: the ridicule of transubstantiation. Hobbes shakes his
head at the credulity of those Christians, who “discerned not
the Bread that was given to them to eat, especially when it was
stamped with (he figure of Christ upon the Crosse, as if they
would have men beleeve it were Transubstantiated, not onely
into the Body of Christ, but also into the Wood of the Crosse,
and that they did eat both together in the Sacrament" (IV, 44,
635).
This ironic and thoroughly sacrilegious version of the
Eucharist involving both the body and Blood and a side order
of the true cross is characteristic of Hobbes’s treatment of
religious mysteries, what Francis Atterbury describes as “a little
knack of playing upon things and words, which he miscalls
wit.’57 His denunciations of figuration notwithstanding, this
witty playing upon things and words becomes for Hobbes

56 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1980), 131.
57 Francis Atterbury, “A Scorner Incapable of True Wisdom" (1694), Sermons and
Discourses, 2 vols (London: 1820), I: 92.
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almost habitual. Clarendon observes that Hobbes’s definitions
frequently seem little more than the "reciting of loose and
disjointed Sentences, and bold Inferences, for the novelty and
pleasantness of the Expressions,” all directed toward the
"humor and inclination of the Time to all kind of Paradoxes"
(Epistle Dedicatory).
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Modern readers have paid little attention to the paradoxical
Hobbes, but Bramhall speaks for many seventeenth-century
readers when he characterizes the progenitor of the Malmes
bury philosophy as “one that knows better how to hold a
paradox than a fort."58
While Hobbes’s contemporaries
frequently remarked the centrality of simile and metaphor in
his rhetorical program, only a few modern critics, most
notably Charles Cantalupo, have undertaken to account for the
“metaphorical density," of Leviathan.59 Robert Adolph is far
more representative of the common consensus that as master
of the new seventeenth-century plain style Hobbes is willing to
admit only “a certain kind of unobtrusive or played out and
hence impersonal metaphor. It is a metaphor sanctioned by
general usage and decorum rather than individual whim or
quirk, a metaphor,,.agreeable to current notions of useful
truth.60
As Adolph would have it, Hobbes’s metaphors have
all been naturalized, cleansed of their whims, quirks and power
either to outrage and disturb. But as we nave seen, close
examination of the metaphors of Leviathan often reveals instead
a more curious form of utility based on their strangeness,
complexity and power to subvert common associations of
words and things. At times, in fact, the sheer oddity of
Hobbes’s figures of speech threatens to overwhelm his argu
ment.
Hobbes contends, for example, that a sovereign relying on
prudent counsellors who know their places is as wise “as he
that useth able Seconds at Tennis play," and "He does next

58 Catching of Leviathan, 507; On Hobbes’s paradoxes, see also Lucy, An Answer
to Mr. Hoobs, 82.
59 Charles Cantalupo, “Hobbes's Use of Metaphor," Restoration: Studies in English
Literary Culture, 1660-1700 12 (1988): 20-JI
60 Robert Adolph, The Rite of Modern Prose Style (Cambridge. Ml T Press, 1968),
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best, that useth his own Judgement only; as he that has no
Second at all. But he that is carried up and down to his
businesse in a framed Counsell, which cannot move but by the
plurality of consenting opinions...does it worse of all, and like
one that is carried to the ball, though by good Players, yet in
a Wheele-barrough, or other frame, heavy of it self, and
retarded also by the inconcurrent judgements, and endeavours
of them that drive it" (II, 25, 311). One can only surmise that
when Robert Vilvain spoke of “kickshews of . similitude” this
is the kind of elaborate, even ludicrous example he had in mind
(did anyone every play tennis in a wheelbarrow?). Nor is
Hobbes done with such quibbling; he rapidly transforms the
comparison of politics and tennis into a similitude between
politics and archery, "And though it be true, that many eyes
see more than one," Hobbes argues, “yet it is not to be
understood of many Counsellours; but then only, when the
Final! Resolution is in one man. Otherwise, because many eyes
see the same thing in divers lines, and are apt to look asquint
towards their private benefit; they that desire not to misse
their marke, though they look about with two eyes, yet they
never ayme but with one” (II, 25, 311). If nothing else,
Hobbes's rhetorical saute from tennis in a wheelbarrow to the
astigmatism of the commonwealth provides amusing evidence
of the "metaphorical density” of Leviathan.
Given his reputation for plainness, it is easy to forget just
how tortuous and peculiar Hobbes’s metaphors can be. One
might cite his curious description of those “Artificiall Chains,
called Civil Lawes." which the people, “by mutuall covenants,
have fastned at one end, to the lips of that Man, or Assembly,
to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power; and at the
other end to their own Ears. These Bonds in their own nature
but weak, may neverthelesse be made to hold, by the danger,
though not by the difficulty of breaking them" (II, 21, 263-4).
Since it is in no sense customary to chain political represent
atives by the lips or their constituents by the ears, Hobbes’s
metaphor hardly seems to have been “sanctioned by general
usage.”61
And there is certainly nothing “unobtrusive” in
Hobbes's description of mixed government. “To what Disease
in the Naturall Body of man, I may exactly compare this

61 In A Literary Leviathan, 116, Charles Cantalupo suggests that this strange
comparison may owe its origins to the renaissance emblem tradition where the
slanderer has a lock and chain clamped on his lips.
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irregularity of a Common-wealth, I know not,” Hobbes
remarks. “But I have seen a man, that had another man
growing out of his side, with an head, armes, breast, and
stomach, of his own: If he had had another man growing out
of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact”
(II, 29, 372-3). Whatever else it may do, this description of a
two-headed side-show freak hardly seems governed by contem
porary notions of usage and "decorum rather than individual
whim or quirk.” Hobbes’s confession that he is uncertain of
exactly which physiological phenomena correspond to mixed
government, and his curious concern with the propriety of his
metaphor (apparently an exact comparison would have required
a three-headed monster), suggests that Hobbes suspected, as we
must, that his argument had been temporarily hijacked by his
trope.
Chapters twenty-two through twenty-nine of Leviathan
provide similar instances of similitude run amok.
Thus
seditious assemblies may be compared "to the Similar pans of
mans Body; such as be Lawful, to the Muscles; such as are
Unlawfull, to Wens, Biles, and Apostemes, engendred by the
unnatural conflux of evill humours” (II, 22, 288). Too little
money in the treasury is like an ague; monopolies cause a
pleurisy in the commonwealth, while the immoderate growth
of independent towns is “like the little Wormes, which
Physicians call Ascarides" (II, 29, 375). To these one may add
“the insatiable appetite, or Bulimia, of enlarging Dominions;
with the incurable Wounds thereby many times received from
the enemy; And the Wens of ununited conquests...As also the
Lethargy of Ease, and Consumption of Riot and Vain Expence”
(II, 29, 375).
Bulimias, ascarides, wounds, wens, strange
lethargies and consumptions: such metaphors neither clarify
nor persuade; they form no part of any rational demonstra
tion. Rather they serve to shock, to surprise and to assault the
reader with their rhetorical violence.
Equally violent is Hobbes’s description of the fits inspired
by belief in a spiritual kingdom which challenges the rights of
the civil sovereign. So strange is Hobbes’s similitude that it is
worth quoting in its entirety.
This is a Disease which not unfitly may be compared to
the Epilepsie, or Falling-sicknesse (which the Jewes took
to be one kind of possession by Spirits) in the Body
Naturall. For as in this Disease, there is an unnaturall
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spirit, or wind in the head that obstructeth the roots of
the Nerves, and moving them violently, taketh away the
motion which naturally they should have from the power
of the Soule in the Braine, and thereby causeth violent,
and irregular motions (which men call Convulsions) in
the parts; insomuch as he that is seized therewith, falleth
down sometimes into the water, and sometimes into the
fire, as a man deprived of his senses; so also in the Body
Politique, when the Spirituall power, moveth the Members of a Common-wealth, by the terrour of punish
ments, and hope of rewards (which are the Nerves of it,)
otherwise than by the Civill Power (which is the Soule
of the Common-wealth) they ought to be moved; and
by strange, and hard words suffocates their understand
ing, it must needs thereby Distract the people, and either
Overwhelm the Common-wealth with Oppression, or
cast it into the Fire of a Civill warre” (II, 29, 371-2).
Whatever terms one may choose to describe this elaborate
similitude, plain style seems eminently unsuitable. Nothing
here is decorous or natural, and clarity falls victim to a series
of figurative comparisons driven by Hobbes’s detestation of
religious pretensions to private inspiration. The equation of
the soul in the brain with the soul in the commonwealth seems
forced at best, the black comedy of Hobbes’s comparison
between epileptic seizures and the assertion of spiritual powers
borders on the grotesque, and the analogy between a common
wealth falling into the heat of civil war and an epileptic
lurching headlong into the fireplace beggars rational analysis.
The same fevered quality may be found in Hobbes’s
denunciation of those Greek writers who had described as
slaves all the subjects of monarchical government.
The
"Venime [of such writers] I will not doubt to compare to the
biting of a mad Dogge, which is a disease the Physicians call
Hydrophobia, or fear of Water. For as he that is so bitten, has
a continual! torment of thirst, and yet abhorreth water; and
is in such an estate, as if the poyson endeavoured to convert
him into a Dogge: So when a Monarchy is once bitten to the
quick, by those Democraticall writers, that continually snarle
at the estate; it wanteth nothing more than a strong Monarch,
which neverthelesse out of a certain Tyrannophobia, or feare of
being strongly governed, when they have him, they abhorre”
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(II, 29, 370). This "long and lurid simile,,,62 like Hobbes’s
epileptic trope, ought to raise suspicions as to the adequacy of
his descriptions of the role of figuration in Leviathan. As one
recent critic has remarked, "in theory, metaphors are contin
gent features of philosophical discourse; though they may play
an important role in elucidating concepts, they our
ought, in
principle to be separable from the concepts andd their adequacy
or inadequacy, and indeed separating essential concepts from
the rhetoric in which they are expressed is a fundamental
philosophical task."63 It is hard to imagine, however, a process
which might disentangle Hobbes’s essential concepts here from
rhe metaphorical matrix in which they are embedded.
There is nothing in Hobbes’s advertisements for his own
constant significations to account for such elaborate or peculiar
similitudes as these. Indeed it is hard to imagine that when
Hobbes speaks of the uses of "apt similitude” this is precisely
what he had in mind. Instead, Hobbes’s manner of proceeding
reminds us of nothing quite so much as his denunciation of
the rhetorical insinuations of false counsellors, who abandon
“firme ratiocination" and “significant and proper language” in
favor of “rash and unevident Inferences...obscure, confused, and
ambiguous Expressions, also all metaphoricall Speeches, tending to
the stirring up of Passion," forms of reasoning and expression
which are “usefull onely to deceive” (II, 25, 307). Like Aris
totle, Hobbes takes a dim view of all rhetorical appeals to the
passions,64 yet it is hard to see how one can interpret such
densely inferential, metaphorical, and ambiguous passages as
these descriptions of tyrannophobia and political epilepsy
without suspecting that the stirring of the passions is precisely
what Hobbes has in mind, and that in his indictment of the
rhetoric of false counsellors, Hobbes inadvertently provides the
standards by which his own rhetoric is to be judged.
Hobbes had warned of the arbitrary nature of stipulative
definitions and figurative embellishments, both of whicn led to
inconstant signification. “And therefore in reasoning, a man
must take heed of words; which besides the signification of

62 Cantalupo, A Literary Leviathan, 130.
63 Culler, p. 147.
64 Victoria Kahn remarks “The use of rhetoric io stir up the passions is associated
by Hobbes with 'private reason' or prudential self-interest...Hobbes tries to define
reason in a way that would differentiate it from considerations of prudence, or,
as we shall see, from rhetoric," 161.
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what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of
the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker...For one
man calleth Wisdome, what another calleth feare: and one
cruelty, what another justice-, one prodigality, what another
magnanimity, and one gravity, what another stupidity, &c.
And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any
ratiocination" (1, 4, 109-10).
Although Hobbes claims a
normative clarity for his own definitions, one suspects that the
excessive, even obsessive quality of his elaborate comparisons
signifies the “nature, disposition and interest of the speaker”
here, and by moving the passions Hobbes tends rather to
entrap than to persuade the reader.
It is not my purpose to provide a taxonomy of Hobbes’s
tropology in Leviathan but merely to suggest mat similitudes
of various kinds play a more ambiguous and subversive role
in Hobbes's rhetorical success than has often been assumed.
John Richetti's description of Hume, Locke and Berkeley
might be extended to Hobbes as well, that “their works are
richly rhetorical and self-consciously persuasive, and yet the
nature of philosophical writing is for them an unresolved issue,
a recurring theme within their writing itself.65 As we have
seen, the unresolved nature of Hobbes’s rhetoric was a matter
of immediate concern to his readers as well. In the words of
Lord Clarendon, “Many things are said very wittily and
pleasantly; tho' it may be many critical men, whom he hath
provoked, may believe many of his Expressions to be incon
gruous, and his Definitions not so exact as might have bin
expected from so great an Artist; and that all those chapters
are rather for delight, in the novelty and boldness of the
expression, then (sic) for any real information in the substantial
part of knowledg" (20). Here Clarendon encapsulates the
traditional dichotomy between philosophy and rhetoric;
clarity, exactness ana true knowledge on one hand versus
pleasantry, wit and literary novelty on the other. And from
Clarendon's point of view, in Leviathan, it is not the philoso
pher but the rhetor who prevails. Hobbes had argued that it
is “a great ability in a man, out of the words, contexture and
other circumstances of language, to deliver himself from
equivocation, and to find the true meaning of what is said.”66

65 Richeni, 1.
66 Qtd. tn Cmtllupo A Literary Leviathan, 60.
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If Hobbes’s first readers are to be credited, however, it is not
escape from ambiguity but delivery into equivocation which
marks one of the most frequently ignored, yet most significant
features of Hobbes’s philosophic style.

